Amid the first wave of Department of Homeland Security proposals developed to secure America’s inbound supply chain from terrorists, one seemed to be reasonably unobjectionable: the TWIC (Transportation Worker Identification Credential) program issuing I.D. cards to the nation’s transportation workers. In fact, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff put this program on the fast track to roll out by the end of 2006.

But controversy over TWIC’s limitations continued to grow as the program evolved. As it begins its rollout, a growing number of participants in the global logistics and supply chain industry feel the government is rushing headlong with the program before all its components are satisfactorily tested, in place, or even available.

Most agree homeland security discussion is fodder for posturing politicians. “There will always be politicians who try to ‘out-homeland-security’ the other,” says Andrew Howell, vice president of homeland security policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C. “The result is some folks get into a position where they feel they need to react as opposed to acting more thoughtfully or deliberately. This is always a challenge in homeland security—for better or worse.”

Nobody takes issue with port security. The enormity and complexity of the global supply chain, with its numerous critical nodes converging at the ports, offers a potential target for terrorists to put at risk lives, livelihoods, and the U.S. economy. But is TWIC really ready for rollout?

The program

From the beginning, the program suffered numerous fits and starts. Industry criticisms range from the amount of material that’s been redacted from the original Inspector General’s report issued by the DHS, to the significant turnover within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to a troubled pilot phase. Although the pilot program conducted in Florida provided some lessons regarding implementation, TWIC program designers didn’t consider those lessons when developing the program that soon will be rolled out, says Howell.

The TWIC enrollment process includes a security threat assessment, which is an in-depth check into individuals’ criminal histories. Information collected will include name, date of birth, 10 fingerprints, a photo, and a description of physical characteristics. Background checks will also include a check against the federal government’s terrorist watch list, a criminal checklist, and legal immigration status.

Once TWIC is fully implemented, TSA will administer it. A contractor—to be named in the final rule—will issue the cards and manage the collected information. TSA estimates it will enroll about 750,000 individuals into the program, including port workers, longshoremen, truckers, and other transportation workers requiring unescorted access to secure port areas. Full enrollment could take up to 18 months.

Then there’s the matter of expense and who will foot the bill. TSA has spent $67 million so far developing the program, which was piloted at 26 sites around the country. According to a news release issued by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), the DHS estimates 39 percent of the cost of implementing the over $1 billion program will fall on port facilities. AAPA is urging Congress to appropriate $400 million annually through the federal Port Security Grant program to assist the nation’s ports in paying for TWIC implementation and other port security measures. The cost to individuals for the TWIC card, good for five years, could be about $139 (yet another issue to be resolved in the final rule).

Apart from the cost, insiders have been criticizing the program’s objectives and procedures as a ‘moving target.’ They particularly cite TWIC’s fluidity, with numerous changes to the rule and with no final plan established sufficiently in advance of the final implementation so preparations could be made prior to TWIC enrollment.

Take the objections voiced by the American Trucking Association. It reports that some of its member carriers participated in the TWIC pilot program “but they said it was completely different from what was laid out in the rule,” according to Martin Rojas, executive director for safety and security operation for the ATA, Alexandria, Virginia. “We need further testing of the systems to ensure they won’t result in backups at port gates.”

Where's the plan?

Andrew Howell, vice president of homeland security policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce

“This is a security issue and yet the government is so hell-bent they are willing to do almost anything that looks like security,” says Mike Mitre, director of port security for twenty-nine West Coast ports included in the International Longshore and Warehouse Union. Mitre, with over 30 years’ experience as a port worker in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, echoes the industry’s concern about the card rollout happening even though one of its key elements—card scanners—remains untested and often not even in place. “It makes no sense because this could mean anyone could use someone else’s card,” he says.

The big question is scanner reliability in ports’ harsh and salty environments. To rectify this, DHS officials, as well as industry and port authority officials, are working to develop standards for contact-less TWIC readers. “Our biggest concern is implementing a card reader system that works effectively in a maritime environment,” says Susan Monteverde, AAPA’s vice president of governmental relations.

Darrin Kayser, a TSA spokesman, acknowledges widespread criticism regarding the program’s numerous false starts and lengthy development. He defends the card rollout, even as card readers are still being tested. “We don’t have the luxury of postponing the TWIC process.

Although the accepted standard of 1 percent error—either from false acceptance or false rejection—might appear reasonable, based on typical peak traffic of 300 trucks per hour, the reality of three false reads per hour could mean havoc for already-congested ports.

Earl Agron, vice president of security at Oakland, California-based APL (providing worldwide container transportation and logistics services), notes the planned rollout might help the TSA and Coast Guard with spot checks on transportation workers. “But it won’t provide us a huge benefit until the program is rolled out with the full and necessary infrastructure, including the readers and national database.”

While supporting the TWIC concept, the industry continues to seek a clear dialogue between everyone affected by the program. Recognizing ports’ differing risk profiles, the industry does not agree to a one-size-fits-all approach.

Comments filed by the National Industrial Transportation League on TWIC’s proposed rule agree, stating “a one-size-fits-all formula of the same security rules with similar costs regardless of threat or operating environment for that facility places a hardship on smaller and less-threatened terminals.”

Kayser admits the country’s ports each have particular layouts and each require technologies specific to their environments. “So developing regulations and implementing a worker credentialing program across the board is a challenge, but the DHS is committed to overcoming this,” he explains.

Rx: intelligent rollout

Why wasn’t there a well-conceived rollout, with all the necessary components in place? That’s what the industry is asking. It’s eager to implement a security program that works—but why has it taken so long? And why the excessive turnover at TSA, which disrupts stable relationships between the agency and the industry? Why no central database against which transportation workers can be checked? Why the failed prototypes, particularly with card readers?

Basic operational measures pose additional concerns. First, says Agron, is the speed at which transportation workers will be able to conduct access control transactions for entering marine facilities. Second is assuring that people with false credentials do not gain access. “Lastly, false rejection rates must only happen as rare exceptions because we don’t want access denied to authorized personnel,” Agron says.

The details of how the national database will operate are yet to be known, as the industry awaits the final ruling. “One of the gaps in the first rule was it didn’t go into any detail regarding the database,” notes Agron.

Of databases, biometrics, and relationships

Biometric readers and scanners remain a subject of controversy. “There won’t be a biometric reader now and they’ve already changed the readers, which initially were supposed to check cards against a central database,” Mitre asserts. “What good is it to have a card if you don’t have the biometric reader?”

Kayser defends criticism against the pilot’s failures. “We tested the technology in the harsh port environment and we achieved our goals in learning to better understand access control, how to enroll workers in the program, and the business processes we need,” he states.

In the absence of a strong and effective federal program, the danger could be that individual states (like Florida) may choose to implement their own programs, which could make the compilation of national data all the more difficult. “In addition to being inefficient and a hassle for drivers to undergo multiple state screenings, there is the potential that if a driver does not pass a state’s screening, he can go to another state where the crimes he committed will not show up in that state’s database,” says ATA’s Rojas.

The trucking industry endorses a single, nationwide, uniform, cost-efficient system for performing background checks on trucker drivers. “We need one national system to conduct true screening and we view TWIC as the card that complies with the MTSA requirement for port security as well as for handling hazardous materials that pose a security risk,” Rojas says.

Finally, critical relationships with stakeholder groups, established and trusted over time, were lost through the overwhelming turnover at TSA, also criticized in a GAO report. “It’s difficult to maintain momentum with a new program of this magnitude if the people you depended on most are dropping like flies and their replacements don’t have the required experience or connections,” states Mitre.

Aiming for balance

Earl Argon,vice president of security, APL

Without a doubt, it’s a significant challenge to create such a colossal infrastructure to ensure security while keeping the cogs of commerce moving smoothly. Balance must prevail between ‘reasonable’ levels of security and freedom for commerce to flow. It’s not a zero-sum game. What the industry wants, though, are sensible trade-offs.

TWIC’s stove-piped approach needs to be rectified. For example, once truck drivers receive a TWIC card they shouldn’t be required to go through any other screening process such as HAZMAT endorsements or air cargo security rules, says Rojas. “The major issue with all these stove-pipes is each one has its own separate cost and each has a separate location where drivers have to go and apply for them.”

Screenings now include background checks for HAZMAT, air cargo, the Free and Secure Trade Program, and maritime environment endorsements. “TWIC was meant to be a universal screening program, and having the card would allow transportation workers to be in compliance with all the screening programs out there,” he says. “Our major concern is if our drivers are not driving, they are not getting paid, and we’re concerned about losing drivers with these issues of cost and convenience.”

At the end of the day, it all comes back to the basics: what will TWIC cost and will it slow commerce? Homeland security is every American’s concern, yet fully inspecting every shipment—as some politicians have suggested—is just not practical. “If our security requirements so impede our economy that the very economy suffers, then the bad guys really do win,” states John Ficker, president of the National Industrial Transportation League.

Mike Mitre of the Longshoremen bluntly sums up his take on what’s gone wrong with the problem: “They turned TWIC into a political program instead of it being what it really should be: a true security program.”

Sidebar: Why Isn’t Biometrics Up and Working?

Biometric IDs involve use of human characteristics such as fingerprints, irises or facial scans to identify an individual. When embedded in a computer chip, individual human characteristics can be embedded in an ID card as part of credentialing or for security processes.

Today, it’s possible to find some use of biometric IDs at a handful of ports—mainly in Florida—under the auspices of the federal TWIC (Transportation Worker Identification Credential) program. A few states, particularly Oklahoma, are embedding biometric chips into driver’s licenses. And there are burgeoning efforts to include biometrics in IDs for hazardous materials drivers and at airports.

Why so little progress in developing biometrics when the technology exists and has been touted widely as a key security tool? The question is even more perplexing given the enormous infusion of federal funding into biometrics technology development for port and other security measures since 9/11.

A number of technology and policy experts, plus fleet owners, say the answer lies with the following: lack of federally mandated standards for biometric-based technologies that would be applicable to the trucking industry; layers of bureaucracy that stretch from federal to local jurisdictions, and absence of a federal, standardized biometrics database for fingerprints accessible to all authorities that handle risk.

One problem for applying biometrics for IDS is the fact that the FBI’s enormous fingerprint database can’t be tapped for civilian use, says Michael Yura, senior vice president for the West Virginia Operations for the Washington, D.C.-based National Biometric Security Project.

Then there’s the lack of a federally-mandated standard for a biometric ID card so no one card operates across all security or risk-related programs—whether at seaports, airports and border crossings. A national standard for the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) scanning equipment exists, but not for biometric technologies that relate to trucking industry security. Without a national standard, biometric ID technology manufactured by one vendor may not work with technology made by another.

Dan Murray, vice president of research for the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI), blames layers of jurisdiction over security matters “without a central blueprint” as a stumbling block in developing biometric IDs. “Even within TSA, multiple systems and vendors are contracted to develop unique pieces of the TWIC ID for ports.”

As a result, he says an airline pilot’s TWIC card wouldn’t work at the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach. “Maybe that’s OK, but what about a truck driver that serves both the Port and LAX airport?”

He says the biometric algorithms used by each vendor “are different enough—which is what gives them their unique selling proposition—that the various systems proposed today will not talk to each other.”

From the perspective of fleet owners like Philip Byrd, the lack of standardization has become a mish-mash that could result in truck drivers carrying large numbers of biometric IDs to enter various facilities. Owner of Bulldog Hiway Express, a regional full truckload carrier based in North Charleston, S.C., Byrd advised the U.S. House Small Business Committee that the TWIC rules, as proposed, place a significant burden on commerce and small intermodal trucking companies without commensurate security benefits.

Martin Rojas, Executive director of Safety Security of Operations, ATA, echoes Byrd’s concern. “Each screening represents a separate cost and process, and some drivers that operate at ports, transport hazardous materials or move C-TPAT cargo across the border undergo three separate, yet equal screenings.”

TSA public relations officials point to successful tests of the biometric ID elements of the TWIC card in at least one location—the state of Florida—where Billy Dickson, a retired lieutenant colonel with the Florida State Highway Police, says his department conducted a “short-term test on the TWIC card a year ago at the Port of Canaveral and Port of Pensacola.” Dickson is now a senior management analyst with the Florida Department of Highway Safety.

“We proved to ourselves that the biometric piece worked,” said Dickson, explaining they set up enrollment centers at the ports using a General Electric-designed chip based on driver’s fingerprints.